Inflation Forecast Targeting: A VAR Approach by W. Douglas McMillin & James S. Fackler





        DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
Inflation Forecast Targeting: An Alternative Approach to  
Estimating the Inflation-Output Variability Tradeoff 
 
 
James S. Fackler 
Department of Economics 
University of Kentucky 
Lexington, KY 40506-0034 
James.Fackler@gmail.com 
 
W. Douglas McMillin 
Department of Economics 
Louisiana State University 








Department of Economics 
Louisiana State University 






Inflation Forecast Targeting: An Alternative Approach to Estimating the 
Inflation-Output Variability Tradeoff 
 
 
James S. Fackler 
Department of Economics 
University of Kentucky 






W. Douglas McMillin 
Department of Economics 
Louisiana State University 










Abstract: We suggest a new way of computing the inflation-output variability tradeoff under inflation forecast 
targeting. Our approach is based on dynamic, stochastic simulations of the average inflation rate over a two-year 
horizon using the moving average representation of a VAR model.  Using real time data over two samples, we 
estimate the inflation-output variability tradeoff for the U.S. and show that it has shifted favorably over time.  We 
analyze the policy interventions required to achieve target inflation in each sample and compare these interventions 











 I. Introduction  
Over the past decade and a half, most major central banks around the world have adopted monetary policy 
frameworks that include either explicit or implicit inflation targets.  The type of inflation targeting implemented by 
central banks is best characterized as flexible inflation targeting, where central banks are simultaneously concerned 
about the variability of output around its natural level as well as the variation of inflation around target.  
Furthermore, Svensson (1997) has argued that inflation targeting should be implemented as inflation forecast 
targeting because of lags in the effect of monetary policy on inflation and because of imperfect control of inflation 
by the central bank. Finally, Bernanke (2004),  in comparing and contrasting use of ―simple feedback policies‖ 
(instrument rules) and ―forecast-based policies,‖ concludes that a forecast-based approach  to policy implementation  
―… has become increasingly dominant in the monetary policymaking of leading central banks…. [T]he Fed relies 
primarily on the forecast-based approach for making policy.‖
1 
Following Taylor‘s (1994) suggestion for estimating the inflation-output variability tradeoff for a variety of 
policy rules,  recent research includes estimation of  the tradeoff between  inflation variability and output variability. 
This research investigates policy rules in the presence of a loss function for the central bank in which there is often a 
substantial weight on the variation of inflation around target relative to the weight on output variability. In this 
literature, a common approach is to vary the weight on the inflation target, derive the associated instrument rule,  
simulate a structural model within which the rule is embedded, and then compute inflation and output variability for 
alternative values of the relative weight on the inflation target. For example, Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) estimate 
empirically the inflation-output variability tradeoff for a variety of rules.
2 For each rule, some of which can be 
categorized as inflation forecast targeting rules, the tradeoff is derived by varying the relative weight on output.  
  In contrast to the instrument-rule approach, we present a novel way of estimating the inflation-output 
variability tradeoff (hereinafter ―variability tradeoff‖) that utilizes forecast-based counterfactual simulations. Our 
motivation is the real-world policymaking process described by Svensson (2003) in which policymakers do not 
write down an explicit loss function but instead evaluate alternative paths for the policy instrument and then pick a 
path that, in Svensson‘s terminology, ―looks best‖.  Given that central banks don‘t announce a specific loss function 
and the weights therein and, following an analogy presented in Svensson (1997), we consider inflation target bands 
                                                 
1 Svensson (2003) provides a detailed critique of instrument rules in an inflation targeting setting. 
2 The loss function employed maintains a weight of unity on the inflation objective, allows varying weight on the 
output goal, and also includes weight for interest rate smoothing. 2 
 
of varying width as proxies for changes in the relative weight on inflation versus output stabilization in a loss 
function. In this approach, wider target bands are analogous to a relatively smaller weight on the inflation target.  
Following McCallum‘s (1988) suggestion that ―rules‖ should be evaluated in a variety of models, we illustrate our 
technique using a VAR model
3 and compute the policy interest rate needed to keep forecast average inflation within 
several pre-specified target bands.
4 For each target band, the policy innovations needed to keep average inflation 
within the band are computed.
5 These innovations, along with typical shocks for the other variables, are then used in 
a dynamic, stochastic out-of-sample forecast of the VAR model to determine the time paths for the system variables. 
For each of the inflation target bands, we simulate the model over 1000 trials, allowing us to compute the variances 
of output and inflation.  By specifying several bands, we generate the variability tradeoff, a menu of options from 
which the policymaker can choose.  As with other procedures for empirical policy evaluations, the Lucas critique is 
a concern, and we consider our results in light of this critique.    
  We illustrate our procedure in two experiments. In order to mimic the policy process, we construct a real 
time data set for each experiment and employ Blinder‘s (1997) description of the policy process as our template for 
the setup of each experiment. 
  The first experiment begins in 1983:10, using a model estimated over the pre-Great Moderation period 
1962:1-1983:9 in which there was substantial variation in both inflation and output growth. Though not part of the 
implicit inflation targeting period denoted by Goodfriend (2005) as emerging under Greenspan, an experiment 
beginning in 1983:10 is a useful benchmark for the second experiment described below. Specifically, we view the 
period beginning in the early 1980s, which followed a period of accelerating inflation that culminated with double-
digit inflation as the decade began, as one with a relatively high weight on inflation control in the underlying policy 
maker preference function. Furthermore, as punctuated by the unusual Saturday evening FOMC meeting in October 
                                                 
3 Although we illustrate the technique with a VAR model, the technique can be applied to structural models as well.   
4 In practice, central banks appear to be willing to tolerate some variability in inflation resulting from either noise or 
temporary factors affecting the price indexes, so that at least implicitly the goal can be interpreted as an average 
inflation target. An example of a central bank that employs average inflation targeting is the Reserve Bank of  
Australia. Reserve Bank Gov. Fraser argued (1993, p. 2) that ―if the rate of inflation in underlying terms could be 
held to an average of 2 to 3 percent over a period of years, that would be a good outcome.‖  He reiterated this 
position a year later, arguing that ―In our judgment, underlying inflation of 2 to 3 per cent is a reasonable goal for 
monetary policy. These figures, incidentally, are not intended to define a (narrow) range; rather, they are indicative 
of where we would like to see the average rate over a run of years.‖ Fraser (1994, p. 21)  
5 The inflation target bandwidths are specified as the goal inflation rate, plus or minus pre-specified tolerance bands 
that include a degenerate bandwidth of zero in which the goal rate is to be met precisely. 3 
 
1979, substantial concern existed with regard to inflation expectations. In broad terms, then, the objectives at the 
beginning of the first experiment were much the same as in inflation targeting regimes.  
  The second experiment computes the variability tradeoff  policy makers would have faced in 2001:1 using 
a model estimated over 1980:1-2000:12, a period characterized by a monetary policy focus on reducing the inflation 
rate, maintaining it at a low level, and reducing variability in inflation and output compared to 1962:1-1983:9.  
  The models used in these experiments were estimated over periods with varying intensity of concern for 
inflation and, especially in the first experiment, substantial variability in both inflation and output.  The Lucas 
critique would thus seem applicable. We address this issue within the context of the discussion by Sims-Zha (2006b) 
and provide some empirical evidence about the relevance of the critique to our experiment using in part the Leeper-
Zha (2003) approach to evaluating modest policy interventions.   
  In Section II, we present the theoretical underpinnings of our experiments. In section III, we present the 
intuition behind our counterfactual analysis, with technical detail relegated to an appendix that is available on 
request.  We also discuss antecedents in the literature to our use of counterfactual simulations to evaluate alternative 
policies. In Section IV, we specify the empirical model, discuss data, and examine the plausibility of the estimated 
model through a presentation of the impulse responses to a policy shock. We include in Section V the main 
statistical results, culminating in presentation of the variability tradeoffs for each experiment.  In Section VI, we 
provide evidence on whether the Lucas critique is a concern for our experiments by computing the ―modesty 
statistic‖ proposed by Leeper-Zha (2003).  Our results suggest that the variability tradeoff constructed for the first 
experiment can be usefully compared to the tradeoff in the second experiment. Finally, in Section VI, we summarize 
the results and discuss possible explanations for them. 
II. Theoretical Background  
  Our empirical analysis is based on two premises. First, in keeping with the Fed‘s dual mandate, we assume 
the Fed takes output stabilization into account, at least in the short-run, in monetary policy decisions even if the 
primary goal of the Fed is price stability.  In the context of our experiments, the narrower (wider) the inflation 
bandwidth, the less (more) concern is implied for output stabilization. In addition, the shorter (longer) the horizon 
for moving the average inflation rate to target, the less (more) concern for output stability.  Second, we assume 
Blinder‘s (1997) idealized description of policy making  is appropriate as a template of the policy process.    4 
 
Attaining inflation objectives has long been a goal of monetary policy, and it can be argued that the Fed 
was an implicit inflation targeter from the early 1980s until at least the onset of the current financial crisis. At the 
beginning of the 1980s, Fed policy was clearly focused on disinflationary strategies. More recently, as inflation 
targeting policy frameworks have become popular around the world, Goodfriend  (2005) has argued (p. 321) that 
―… the Greenspan Fed adopted, gradually and implicitly, an approach to monetary policy characterized as inflation 
targeting.‖ Goodfriend cites Congressional testimony by Alan Greenspan that the inflation objective would be 
achieved when ―the expected rate of change of the general level of prices ceases to be a factor in individual and 
business decision making.‖
6 Thus, that the U.S. used a targeting framework, at least implicitly, during the time 
periods for our experiments is a reasonable assumption.  
  With regard to the policy process, Blinder (1997) describes a two-step procedure for policymakers:  
―First, you must plan an entire hypothetical path for your policy instrument, from 
now until the end of the planning horizon, even though you know you will activate 
only the first step of the plan. It is simply illogical to make your current decision in 
splendid isolation from what you expect to do in subsequent periods. Second, when 
next period actually comes, you must appraise the new information that has arrived 
and make an entirely new multiperiod plan. If the surprises were trivial, that is, if the 
stochastic errors were approximately zero, step one of your new plan will mimic the 
hypothetical  step  two  of  your  old  plan.  But  if  significant  new  information  has 
arrived, the new plan will differ notably from the old one. Third, you must repeat this 
reappraisal process each and every period.‖ 
 
  We interpret this as follows. When the FOMC meets, it should evaluate, inter alia, the Greenbook forecasts 
and the various policy options contained in the Bluebook. This is the ‗first step of the plan‘ by which ‗an entire 
hypothetical path for the policy instrument, from now until the end of the planning horizon‘ is considered. Note that 
the forecasts and assesments of the policy alternatives in the planning horizon extend well beyond the next FOMC 
meeting.
7 It is this ‗first step‘ of the Blinder two step procedure we are empirically modeling.  The second step of the 
                                                 
6 In detail, Goodfriend argues that the Greenspan Fed: (1) approached its inflation goal gradually, trying to avoid 
disruptions to output, consistent with flexible inflation targeting; (2) would not have deliberately (Goodfriend‘s 
emphasis) undertaken policies that would raise inflation above 2% after achieving PCE inflation in that range in the 
mid-1990s; (3) would have been unlikely to deliberately (his emphasis) aim at inflation below 1% given the costs 
associated with deflation and problems associated with the zero nominal interest rate bound; and (4) that when 
actual and expected inflation were well-contained, the Fed ―aggressively‖ pursued countercyclical policy. 
7 Interestingly, by the time of our second experiment in 2001, the Bluebook presentation of policy alternatives 
presents long-range policy paths for the federal funds rate and the implications for broad macro aggregates through 
2005,  an ―entire hypothetical path for the policy instrument … even though you know you will activate only the 
first step of the plan.‖ Thus, at least part of the strategy suggested by Blinder in 1997, which we model below, 
seemed to be part of the operating procedures at the time of our second experiment. In 1983, during our first 
experiment, the longer-range horizon was shorter, however, about a year. There was also a heavier focus on 5 
 
Blinder proecdure would come at the next FOMC meeting, when ‗new information‘ has arrived and ‗an entirely new 
multiperiod plan‘ is implemented.  
Svensson (1997, 1999)  has developed a simple, analytical model of inflation targeting that provides a 
useful technical background for the first step of Blinder‘s policy description under the dual mandate. Specifically, he 
presents a model of inflation targeting implemented as inflation forecast targeting. We consider the key points in the 
Svensson model to fix ideas prior to our empirical implementation. While in Svensson‘s model the lag between the 
policy variable and inflation is two periods, in our empirical work we allow the policy variable to influence inflation 
over the 24 month period we adopt as Blinder‘s planning horizon.  
Svensson‘s model specifies a setting where the policy interest rate affects inflation with a two period lag. 
Accordingly, the interest rate is set at a level today consistent with forecasts of inflation two periods later. The two 
period lag arises by assuming that the current interest rate setting affects the output gap with a one period lag, which 
in turn affects inflation with a subsequent one period lag. Recall from the introduction that Bernanke (2004) 
characterized forecast-based approaches as ―dominant‖ in policymaking.    
  In Svensson‘s setting, the aggregate supply/Phillips curve relationship is given by 
                                                                                 11 t t y t t y                                                     (1)  
while the aggregate demand/IS is given by 
                                                                 1 1| 1 () t y t z t r t t t t y y z i r                                            (2) 
where  1 t    is the inflation rate in period t+1,  t y is the output gap,  1 t   is a random shock to aggregate supply,  t i is the 
nominal interest rate,   1| tt    is the expected inflation rate conditioned on information at time t,  r is the equilibrium 
real interest rate,  1 t    is a random shock to aggregate demand, and  t z is a vector of exogenous variables given by   
                                                                                11 t z t t zz    , 
with  z  being a conformable vector and  t  a random vector with the same dimensionality as  t z . The period loss 
function, reflecting the dual mandate, is  




tt y                       𝜋∗                                  (3) 
                                                                                                                                                             
monetary aggregates though with qualitative discussion of the interest rate paths consistent with the alternative 
forecasts. 
  6 
 
where  is the relative weight on output stability and 𝜋∗ is the target inflation rate.  Svensson (1997) shows that the 
first-order condition for a minimum is  
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,  (0) 0 c  , and 
( ) lim ( ) 1 cc       . The form of equation (4), with the two-period-ahead inflation forecast and the one-period-
ahead output gap forecast, is the result of the lag structure in the model; setting the interest rate today influences 
only future values of these variables. 
  Consider the meaning of equation (4). As a result of minimizing the specified loss function subject to the 
existing tradeoff of inflation for output in equation (1), equation (4) is a consequence of the equality between the 
marginal rate of susbstitution in the policy maker preferences with the marginal rate of technical substitution. In 
practice, Svensson (2003, p. 451) notes that ―the loss function is not specified in this detail.‖ Rather, given available 
information and any judgment to be applied, various forecasts for alternative paths for the policy interest rate are 
generated as in the Fed‘s Bluebook, and the policymaking committee then picks the ―combination of forecasts that 
‗looks best,‘ in the sense of achieving the best compromise between stabilizing the inflation gap and stabilizing the 
output gap, that is, implicitly minimizing [the loss function].‖ (p. 451).
8 Our empirical work below will exploit this 
interpretation of the policy process rather than explicitly specifying a loss function. 
  Given period t information, equation (2) implies that the one-period-ahead output gap forecast is  
                                                                 1 1| () t y t z t r t t t y y z i r                                                (5) 
and from equation (1) the two-period-ahead inflation forecast is 
                                                                            2| 1| 1| t t t t y t t y                                                          (6) 
Subtacting  *  from both sides of (6) and using (4) to substitute for  1| y t t y   gives  
                                                                         2| 1| * ( )( *) t t t t c           
                                                 
8 Svensson (2009) argues that equation (4) implies  , 1, * ( )( *) ( ) ( *) t t t t t cc

                   where  , tt    is the 
t    inflation forecast that ―looks good‖ in period t. In Svensson‘s analysis, the policy is engineered so inflation 
asymptotically approaches its target; driving inflation to the target within a specified policy horizon may not be 
efficient. In our empirical analysis, we adopt relatively long (48 and 36 month) transition periods to the target in the 
spirit of the asymptotic approach.  7 
 
Substituting the right-hand-side of (6) for  2| tt   and then the right-hand side of (5) for  1| tt y   in the resulting 
expression and then solving for it yields 
1|
1 ( )
1 ( *) *
y z
t t t t t
y r r r
c
i r y z
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Finally, taking the expectation of equation (1) conditional on time t information and substituting for  1| tt   gives 
                                        
1 ( ) 1 ( )
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y z
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cc
i i y z
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            (7) 
where  * ir   . Equation (7) is the setting for the interest rate that satisfies the first order condition, equation (4), 
and implies that the optimal interest rate setting depends not only on the output gap and the deviation of inflation 
from target, but also on other model variables included in z. Note also that equation (7) is not a modified Taylor rule 
since (i) z represents the remaining variables in the system and (ii) this interest rate setting is implied by an 
optimization process (as reflected in the coefficients on the inflation and output gaps). The Taylor rule is generally 
simpler (i.e., omits the variables in z or includes only a small subset) and has coefficients on the inflation and output 
gap terms that are policy decision variables. 
  As noted, Svensson (2003) argued  that central bankers generally don‘t explicitly reveal a loss function, a 
step we avoid here as well. Nonetheless, two comments about extending models such as that above to include non-
degenerate inflation bands are in order. 
  First, in a typical loss function, such as equation (3), λ represents the relative weight on output. Svensson 
(1997) states that a ―wide [inflation] band could then potentially indicate that the central bank has a relatively high λ 
and hence a significant output stabilization goal. A narrow [inflation] band could indicate a commitment to a low or 
even zero λ.‖ (p. 1135). Alternatively, we could normalize directly on inflation variability, where   is the relative 




tt y       .  Our bandwidth parameter, , is negatively related to 
 ; the narrower our bandwidth, the less tolerant is the policy maker to inflation variability, and implicitly the 
higher the loss associated with inflation variability.
9 As in equation (4), where the setting of   determines the slope 
                                                 
9 For the limiting case of  approaching  0,  would become arbitrarily large. In this case, the policy maker would 
be a strict inflation targeter, abandoning the dual mandate. 8 
 
of the tradeoff between inflation and output deviations from desired levels, as we set τ to various values to trace the 
variability trade-off, we are implicitly varying the value of  .  
  Second, Flood-Isard (1989) present a model quite similar to that of Svensson detailed above with a positive 
weight on inflation variability, such as    in the above paragraph. The policy maker pursues one type of policy 
when the target variable (the exchange rate in their case) is within a band but another policy when this variable is 
shocked outside the band. They derive optimal policies with a loss function for two practical cases: discretion and 
partially state contingent. They demonstrate the existence of a mixed strategy (a probability weighted average of the 
two) which is time consistent under certain conditions. That is, an optimal policy exists that is different outside that 
band than inside and still consistent with optimization. Thus, theoretical models underlying our empirical 
application consistent with optimization exist. 
III. Methodology 
a. Estimation of the the Variability Tradeoff 
We next present the basic intuition behind the methodology used to estimate the variability tradeoff for our 
inflation target. Consistent with Blinder, we plan a nominal interest rate path over the planning horizon; consistent 
with Svensson, we compute the policy interest rate needed to attain a forecast of the average inflation rate over a 24 
month period on or within a prespecified band. Technical details on the computation of the interest rate setting 
(analogous to equation 7) needed to attain the inflation target are contained in the appendix.  
We specify the inflation goal in terms of a 24-month average inflation forecast.
10,11 That is, policy makers 
are forward-looking, planning interest rate policy to maintain what we will call the forecast average inflation rate 
(FAIR) to be consistent with the inflation target on or within a specified inflation band.  Aiming for inflation on or 
within a band is consistent with current practice by some  inflation-targeting central banks, and reveals a willingness 
to accept deviations from the mid-point of the target band. That is, if the forecast for inflation over the next 24 
                                                 
10 Svensson (2003) notes that both the Bank of England and the Svierges Riksbank have used a two-year inflation 
forecast horizon for conducting monetary policy. 
11 Note that there is no necessary reason the ‗planning horizon‘ need be equal to the time frame over which the 
average inflation rate is targeted by the policy authority. We set both equal to 24 months to roughly mimic reality. 
Specifically, the Greenbook forecasts are now for a period of at least several years. And, as in the previous footnote, 
some inflation-targeting central banks employ two year forecasts for inflation as the inflation objective. There is no 
reason, for example, that the forecasts evaluated at a policy meeting could not extend to, say, three years while 
announcing and maintaining a goal for a two-year average inflation rate over this planning horizon. 9 
 
months is consistent with the inflation target, i.e., on or within the band, no policy intervention is undertaken. If the 
FAIR is outside the band, then an intervention is used to return this measure of inflation to the band.
12  
  Since a forecast of the inflation process is needed, we need to specify the source of these forecasts in our 
analysis. We begin with a structural model 
                                                           0 1 1 ... t t t p t p t y A y Ay A y                   (8) 
In equation (8),  t y is an (Nx1) vector of variables, including the inflation rate and the federal funds interest rate.
13 
The elements of the i A matrices represent the structural coefficients and the elements of  t  are structural shocks. We 
assume that  ( ') E   is diagonal. The reduced form of (8) is  ()tt L y e  , where 
1
1 ( ) ...
p
p L I L L      . 
Reduced-form coefficient matrices are given by 
1
0 () ii I A A
    and reduced-form shocks by 
1
0 () tt e I A 
  . The 
moving average matrix is defined as 
1 ( ) [ ( )] C L L
  , with  0 CI  . Define
1
0 () ss D C I A
 . The moving average 
representation (MAR) of equation (8), expressed in terms of the structural shocks, is 
         
0






 .          (9) 
  Fundamental to our analysis is the historical decomposition, which in its basic form is found by advancing 
equation (9) by n periods and then decomposing the resulting expression into two terms: 




t n s t n s s t n s
s s n
y D D 

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
                                  (10) 
The second term on the right hand side of equation (10) is the dynamic forecast or base projection (BP) of  tn y   
conditional on information at time t. The first term on the right hand side shows the influence on  tn y   of the shocks 
to the variables in the system between periods t+1and t+n. Even though the expected values of these shocks are zero, 
policy makers know that the realizations of these shocks over any particular period are likely to be nonzero, which 
provides the motiviation for the stochastic part of our simulation. These shocks, drawn from the estimated residuals, 
represent the source of variability around the base projection. Given a set of shocks to the system, we obtain 
monthly inflation rates from the relevant equation in system (10), which are then averaged to obtain the FAIR.  
                                                 
12 While we do not do so in our simulations, it would be straightforward in practice to allow for judgment in the 
forecast by including an adjustment for factors that are outside the model but deemed by policymakers to be 
important for the immediate policy exercise. 
13 For simplicity, we do not explicitly consider expectational variables in our analysis. We do note, however, that 
under some conditions models with expectations of variables can be solved for a VAR of the type estimated here; 
see Fernandez-Villaverde-Rubio-Ramirez-Sargent-Watson (2007) and Ireland (2004) for examples. 10 
 
  If the FAIR deviates from target, a policy action is called for. In an obvious extension of equation (3) the 
goal for policy is to remain on or within the range ( * )    where is half the bandwidth (including the case of a 
zero bandwidth), with policy aiming at ( * )    when inflation is below the band and aiming at ( * )    when 
inflation is above the band. For a non-degenerate bandwidth, our policy experiments return FAIR to the edge of the 
band rather than the midpoint for four reasons. First, although we don‘t model the loss function explicitly, our 
presumption about the dual mandate means that a more aggressive policy action needed to return the FAIR to the 
midpoint of the band rather than the edge induces additional variability in output, raising the overall loss.
14 Second, 
if there is multiplicative uncertainty about the economy, in the sense of Brainard (1967), then the policy authority 
may not necessarily aim at the midpoint of the range. That is, if there is not certainty equivalence, then aiming at the 
midpoint is no longer necessarily optimal.
15 Third, if policy makers want to minimize their impact on financial 
markets, returning to the edge of the inflation band requires a smaller interest rate innovation, and thus helps 
minimize interest rate movements. That is, we undertake the smallest policy action needed to attain the inflation 
objective over the two year horizon. Of course, the tradeoff is that our smaller financial market inverventions may 
be more frequent than relatively aggressive actions aimed at returning to the midpoint of the band. Fourth, as 
Blinder noted, during his Federal Reserve tenure there was a  lack of concensus on the desirable inflation rate among 
the governors as well as a tendency to wait for opportunistic shocks to lower the inflation rate, in practice restraining 
inflation that is ―too high‖ but not necessarily moving it aggressively toward a firm number such as 2%. 
  We emphasize that in our analysis the policy objective is the FAIR over the 24-month period rather than 
either the current or any particular future monthly inflation rate. Current inflation is the result of past decisions by 
both policy makers and private agents in the economy and is presumably not directly affected by current policy. 
Reported inflation, or a forecast of a particular monthly inflation rate, may deviate from the inflation target without 
necessarily calling for a policy action as long as the FAIR suggests that the longer-run objective will be satisfied. 
However, if the FAIR deviates from target or lies outside the band, a policy action is called for. In our application, 
                                                 
14 This is essentially the point of opportunistic policy described in Orphanides-Small-Wieland-Wilcox (1997). For 
additional discussion, see also Result 12 in Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1999).  
15 Despite the fact that the ―Brainard conservatism principle‖ (as Blinder dubs it) does not apply in all cases, he 
notes that as a central banker, he viewed the principle as ―extremely wise.‖ The wisdom of the basic Brainard result 
is included as well in Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1999), result 11. Specifically, they argue that ―parameter uncertainty 
may reduce the response of the policy instrument to disturbances in the economy.‖ That is, the reduction in the 
response may lead to aiming for the edge of the band rather than the midpoint.  Further, Barlevy (2009)  has shown 
that when robust control techniques are applied in circumstances similar to those emphasized by Brainard, robust 
control implies an even more ―conservative‖ policy response than does Brainard.   11 
 
we will use the federal funds rate as the policy instrument to control the inflation rate, and a policy action in a 
particular month is defined as an intervention in the funds rate equation in that month.
16 Due to interaction with 
other system variables via system dynamics, a policy action in a particular month will affect inflation over the 
remainder of the horizon. That is, even if the funds rate has a relatively small contemporaneous effect on inflation, 
marginal changes in this rate can still have substantial effects on long-run inflation. 
  Diagram 1 gives a schematic presentation of our model of the first stage of the Blinder process in an 
inflation-forecast targeting regime that desires to keep inflation on or within a target band.  Period 1 on the 
horizontal axis is the first period of the planning horizon, which in practice would be the date of an FOMC meeting. 
The vertical axis is the inflation rate.  
  Two alternative inflation bands are sketched on Diagram 1. The band centered at 2%, with ± % bands 
around this midpoint, represents our presumed long-run goal for policy. Of course, it is possible that at the time an 
inflation target is adopted, actual inflation will be above this long run target range; after all, inflation targets are 
adopted to try to control an inflation problem. In Diagram 1, the negatively sloped lines (for simplicity) represent a 
linear transitional inflation band in which inflation is to be gradually lowered, so that after some (possibly publicly 
announced) period of time, inflation will be brought into the long-run range. In Diagram 1, a policy of gradualism 
over 48 months is depicted. This period could be shorter or longer depending on policy maker preferences.  
  Consider period 1 in Diagram 1. The policy maker has data through period 0 and is interested in policy 
simulations conditional on data through period 0, a procedure roughly similar to that undertaken at a given FOMC 
meeting. Assume that the inflation rate is about 10%. The policy maker makes a forecast of inflation over the next 
24 months and computes the average of the monthly inflation forecasts. The period 1-24 is ―underlined‖ beneath the 
horizontal axis. If the FAIR is within the transitional inflation band, such as point ―x‖, then no policy intervention is 
undertaken. Alternatively, if the FAIR is at a point like ―w‖ a policy intervention is needed that will bring the 
current forecast to the upper edge of the band.
17 During period 0, in planning for period 2 a new simulation is made 
conditional on what was done in period 1, intervention or not. If an intervention was needed in period 1, the 
                                                 
16 As is shown in the technical appendix, the desired change in the funds rate is implemented by replacing the 
residual term in the funds rate expression with an appropriately-sized shock that brings the funds rate to the desired 
level.  
17 If the forecast inflation rate is below the band, then in a transitional period such as that characterized by the 
negatively sloped inflation band in Diagram 1, the policy maker may choose to conduct policy consistent with 
opportunistic disinflation. This would entail lowering the transitional range of the inflation target so that the period 
over which the gradualist policy need be conducted is shortened. 12 
 
magnitude of this intervention must be incorporated into the analysis to properly forecast inflation over the next 24 
month period in which average inflation is to be on or inside the band. That is, the period 0 forecast for inflation 
over periods 2-25 is computed, as indicated by the second ―underline‖ beneath Diagram 1. If the forecast is within 
the band, similar to ―x‖ in period 1, then no intervention is needed; if it is above the band, similar to ―w‖ in period 1, 
an appropriate intervention is conducted to bring the 24 month average inflation forecast within the band. If, at a 
given policy meeting in period 0, Blinder‘s ‗planning horizon‘ is 2 years (‗even though you know you will only 
activate the first step of the plan‘) then inflation forecasts are conducted through the end of this horizon, so a period 
0 forecast is needed for month 24, which extends over months 25-48, the last underlined period in Diagram 1. 
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  Our choice of a 48 months as a gradual transition to the long run inflation target is based on both theoretical 
considerations and observation of central bank practices. Though not suggesting a specific length of the transition 
period, Svensson (1997) argues theoretically that a positive weight on the output gap in the loss function implies that 
optimal disinflationary policy will be one of gradualism, as in our downwardly sloped transition bands in diagram 1. 
Given the ―dual mandate,‖ U.S. policymakers should then approach inflation targets gradually. In practice, 13 
 
according to Bernanke-Mishkin (1997), central bankers behave as suggested by Svensson. They note (p. 99): ―Initial 
announcements of inflation targeting generally allow for a gradual transition from the current level of inflation to a 
desired steady state, usually the level deemed consistent with price stability.‖ Furthermore, Bernanke- Mishkin later 
note that after the 1979 oil shock, the German Bundesbank ―announced the ‗unavoidable‘ inflation rate to be 4 
percent, then moved its target gradually down to 2 percent over a six-year period.‖ (p. 101). In the U.S., Goodfriend 
(2005) indicated that an ―inflation scare‖ in 1987 due to the infusion of liquidity after the October 1987 stock market 
crash took the Greenspan Fed ―… about five years to overcome‖ (p. 8). Our choice of 48 months as the transition 
period is a bit shorter than, but not at great odds with, these descriptions of the behavior of inflation-targeting central 
banks.   However, we also consider a shorter transition of 36 months to the inflation target; this shorter transition is 
consistent with a higher relative weight on achieving the inflation target as opposed to output stabilization. 
               We now present the setup of our experiments, each of which produces a point on the variability tradeoff 
the central bank would have faced at a particular time. Each experiment corresponds to our model of the ‗first step‘ 
in the Blinder policy process.  
  For each of our two time periods, we estimate a VAR model using real-time data that ends with the period 
before the start of the simulation. We compute the base projection at the end of the estimation period, mimicking the 
real-time forecasting process just prior to an FOMC meeting. This forecast of yt+1 through yt+24 is represented by the 
second right-hand-side term in equation (10) and is estimated from the lagged historical residuals from the VAR. 
Since the base projection is based on historical residuals, it does not change across the trials of a given experiment.  
  For each time period, we conduct four experiments for both the 48 month and 36 month transition periods. 
Each experiment has 1000 trials with a pre-specified bandwidth.  For each trial, we draw (with replacement) a vector 
of residuals of length 48 from the estimated residuals for each equation in the system.
18    
  Each experiment starts with the actual inflation rate in the period prior to the experiment and gradually 
lowers the inflation target to 2% over a 48 (36) month period (as in Diagram 1), subject to the bandwidth. The 
alternative bandwidths are 0, 1, 2, and  where a bandwidth of 0 means that the focus is on the target itself and a 
bandwidth of represents a stochastic simulation using the draw from the historical residuals without any policy 
intervention. So, in Diagram 1, given the negatively sloped transition path, the dashed lines could assume one of the 
indicated bandwidth values. The initial 24 terms of the drawn vector of shocks are used to compute the first term on 
                                                 
18 As noted above, we need 48 residuals since during the last month of the two year planning horizon, policy makers 
want to know the FAIR for the subsequent 24 months. 14 
 
the right-hand-side of (10). When combined with the base projection, equation (10) gives the path the economy, as 
represented by the system of equations, would follow under this trial. Combining the base projection and the initial 
24 elements of the vector of draws from the residuals gives the policy maker a forecast of inflation for each of the 
next 24 months for this particular trial. The policy maker averages these 24 individual monthly inflation rates to 
compute the FAIR. If this rate is inside the band or equal to target in the case of a 0% band, no policy intervention is 
needed. On the other hand, if this inflation rate is outside the band, a preemptive policy action of sufficient 
magnitude to return the 24 month average forecast inflation rate to the closest edge of the band is calculated.
19 That 
is, if a policy intervention is needed to attain the band, the drawn residual from the interest rate equation is replaced 
with one that is computed to assure that the FAIR attains the policy objective.
20 This policy action, computed as 
detailed in the appendix, produces an interest rate analogous to equation (7) above. Furthermore, this policy 
intervention is carried along for the remainder of the trial, affecting all the system variables in later time periods. 
Also, as is shown in the appendix, the computation by which the needed intervention is done is conditional on the 
shocks from the random draw for later time periods; the current policy action needed to attain the inflation target is 
―identified‖ using the remaining residuals from the draw.  Finally, note that since the residuals in equation (10) are 
structural, the residual drawn for the policy equation can be replaced with the needed policy action without 
implications for the random shocks to the other equations since it was assumed there is no contemporaneous 
correlation among the structural shocks.
21,22  
                                                 
19 We note that attempting to use the funds rate to control the inflation rate at very short horizons may lead to 
instrument instability. The intuition behind this statement is that the interest rate is not an important component of 
measured prices and that the contemporaneous effect of a change in the interest rate on aggregate demand is very 
small. Consequently, an interest rate change would have a relatively small near-term impact on the inflation process, 
requiring large interest rate movements to affect short-term inflation. With a longer-term inflation objective, say one 
of several years as we employ here, a current interest rate change has lagged effects on the inflation rate, consistent 
with system dynamics. This point is recognized by central bankers, who generally implement policy via interest rate 
innovations which are allowed to work their way through the dynamics of the economy.  
20 As we will discuss further below, this procedute is the same as that adopted by Leeper-Zha (2003). 
21 An alternative approach for obtaining a desired average inflation rate would be to employ a ―constant interest 
rate‖ approach, which would take the base projection and adjust it by imposing a constant interest rate over the 24-
month horizon that brings about the desired average inflation rate. This approach thus implicitly imposes an entire 
path for the shocks to the interest rate equation. In our analysis, we identify the current policy shock needed to attain 
the objective (given the rest of the draw) while the constant interest rate approach  implicitly identifies a vector of 
shocks, current and for the remainder of the horizon, needed to maintain a constant interest rate and simultaneously 
attain the inflation objective. The constant interest rate approach thus imposes more policy action than needed to 
attain the policy objective. It imposes interest rate smoothness while our approach allows the path of rates to be 
determined by the response of the policy maker to the forces that may drive the FAIR outside the band.  
22 It is possible to model correlations among the structural shocks, as in Bernanke-Mihov (1998). If such modeling 
included contemporaneous correlation between the policy innovation and other variables, then other structural 15 
 
  For each month in the planning period, a policy action is either needed or not. Either way, the dynamic path 
of the economy is computed. After passing through the planning horizon, intervening as needed, we obtain at the 
end a path for the system of variables in which policy is used to attain the inflation target. By construction, this 
counterfactual path over the planning horizon is consistent with the inflation objective of the policy authorities. With 
1000 trials for each bandwidth, we can compute the variance of each element of the vector of variables.   
  Over the 1000 trials in a given experiment we determine the variances of inflation (around the trial mean) 
and the output gap (also around the trial mean). At a point in time and for a given inflation band, we use these 
variances of inflation and output to represent a point on the variability tradeoff. Using the four alternative 
bandwidths then allows us to plot the available inflation-output variability frontier. The policy maker can then select 
the value for that ‗looks best‘ in the characterization of Svensson (2003, 2009).  By using different time periods, 
we can also discover how the point estimate of the frontier has changed over time.  
  To summarize, in the first step of Blinder‘s process, the policy maker takes into account the results of the 
entire 24-month planning horizon since (in his words) ―[i]t is illogical to make your current decision in splendid 
isolation from what you expect to do in subsequent periods.‖ This longer range planning process, analogous to the 
evaluation of the Green and Bluebooks at the FOMC meeting, may be aimed at issues such as whether there is 
instrument instability for a given policy which might not show up at shorter horizons, whether there are undesirable 
characteristics of the implied interest rate interventions (are they too frequent? do they impart too much variability 
into the financial market?), and so on.  At the same time, the policy maker also knows that it is likely to ‗activate 
only the first [portion] of the plan.‘ 
  In the second step of Blinder‘s procedure, ‗new information that has arrived‘ is assessed, and an ‗entirely 
new multiperiod plan‘ is made. In real time, this would include additional economic data arriving subsequent to an 
FOMC meeting, and the new plan would incorporate information contained in the shocks to these data. If we were to 
proceed to this second step in our analysis, we would collect a new real-time data set and then at the time of the next 
FOMC meeting re-do the experiments described above.  
b. Comparison with Previous Studies 
  As referenced earlier, the use of counterfactual analysis to evaluate policy alternatives  has several 
precedents in the literature.  Fackler-Rogers (1995) were the first to suggest the general approach used here, though 
                                                                                                                                                             
shocks would be affected when a policy shock needed to attain the FAIR is imposed. We do not model such 
contemporaneous correlations here. 16 
 
their analysis was in a simpler setting and was conducted in-sample in contrast to the out-of-sample analysis in the 
current paper.  Specifically, in the Fackler-Rogers analysis a policy shock in a period was selected to attain a target 
exchange rate for that period rather than aiming at a 24-month average for the target variable.  Christiano (1998) 
used a similar in-sample approach, computing the shocks to the interest rate equation needed in a given period to 
keep the money supply on a constant growth rate path during the Great Depression.  He reported that the resulting 
path for the system variables other than the money supply ―oscillated so wildly‖ that his presented results used an ad 
hoc method of combining a weighted average of the counterfactual shocks with the historical shocks rather than pure 
counterfactual residuals as is done here. 
  Leeper-Zha (2003) evaluated the effects of changes in the target funds rate beginning in 1990 and in 1994-
95.  Using a different empirical model that employed a richer specification of the reserves market than Leeper-Zha, 
Fackler-McMillin (2002) compared with no-change policies the effects of specified changes in the target fed funds 
rate on the time paths of output, the price level, and other model variables in 1995, and again in 1998. In contrast to 
these two studies which computed the shocks to the funds rate required to achieve an arbitrary target funds rate, the 
current paper computes the shocks to the funds rate required to generate the time path of the funds rate that achieves 
an inflation target.  Finally, we note that Leeper-Zha contributed importantly to the policy evaluation literature by 
constructing a ―modesty statistic‖ that allows one to test whether the Lucas critique is a concern for policy analysis, 
and we employ this statistic to evaluate our counterfactual experiments.   
  Sims-Zha (2006b) considered the effects of changes in the monetary policy reaction function in a VAR 
model on the economy‘s response to shocks to non-policy variables.  They first computed the effect of the policy 
and non-policy shocks on the model variables assuming a monetary policy reaction function that featured lagged 
response of the policy variable (the funds rate or alternatively the 3-month T-bill rate) to all model variables and 
contemporaneous response to only a subset of the model variables.  They then separately computed the response of 
the economy to non-policy shocks assuming the central bank keeps the policy rate constant.   Our analysis differs in 
several regards: (1) as noted earlier, we compute the policy shocks required to generate the (non-constant) path of 
the funds rate that achieves the inflation target and (2) since shocks hit all sectors of the economy simultaneously, 
we compute the funds rate shocks in the presence of shocks to the entire system rather than consider shocks to each 
non-policy variable as a separate case. 
 17 
 
IV. Empirical Model 
  As noted earlier, the variables in the VAR model we estimate include those in the typical New Keynesian 
model: the output gap, the inflation rate, and the federal funds rate. Additionally, we include the rate of change in a 
commodity price index for two reasons.  First, we add commodity prices following earlier literature that addresses 
the well-known ―price puzzle‖ often found in VAR models. Second, since commodity price volatility is often used 
to represent supply shocks, as a first (and likely crude) approximation, we use this variable to help control for 
changes in output and inflation volatility emanating from sources outside the policy process.  In order to establish 
the usefulness of the model for monetary policy evaluation, the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy are 
estimated by computing impulse response functions (IRFs) for shocks to the federal funds rate.  
                The model is estimated using monthly real time data over two time periods: 1962:1-1983:9 and 1980:1-
2000:12.  Our first set of counterfactual inflation targeting experiments begins in 1983:10, a year after the end of 
reserve targeting that characterized the October 1979-October 1982 period, thus allowing for adjustment to the new 
operating procedure to be basically completed before initiating the experiments.  The second counterfactual begins 
in 2001:1. This starting point was chosen for two reasons. One is that there was considerable uncertainty about the 
macroeconomic effects of the decline in stock prices that began in 2000. The second is that it allows a year‘s 
transition from the temporary effects of the Y2K preparations of the Federal Reserve and the subsequent volatility in 
the growth rate of the monetary base.
23  In estimating the VAR, twelve lags of all variables are employed. 
  The transformations of the variables in the model follow the transformations of the variables in the typical 
New Keynesian model.
24 Measuring the output gap at a monthly frequency is problematic, and we considered three 
alternative measures.  The first measure was constructed by subtracting the quadratic trend of log real GDP from the 
log of real GDP at a quarterly frequency and then interpolating to monthly values.
25 The second measure was the log 
of real GDP minus the log of Hodrick-Prescott filtered real GDP, again interpolated from quarterly to monthly 
                                                 
23 There was a big spike in total reserves in the system at the end of 1999, and the growth rate of the monetary base 
jumped sharply.  Reserves quickly returned to the pre-Y2K level, and monetary base growth fell sharply over 2000 
and even became negative toward the end of 2000, although it had begun to rise by the end of the year.   
24 Given the considerable debate about the power of unit root and cointegration tests, we chose to employ the 
transformations of the variables used in the typical New Keynesian model. 
25 The interpolation used the random walk option of the distrib.src procedure from WinRATS 6.02b.  A commonly-
used alternative measure of the output gap is the log of real gdp minus the log of potential output constructed by the 
Congressional Budget Office. However, since the CBO measure of potential output is not available on a real-time 
basis, we utilized the real GDP output gap measures described in the text.  Although series such as industrial 
production and personal income are available monthly, we concentrated on real GDP and interpolated the output gap 
measures to monthly frequency since the focus of policy is on broad economic activity and real GDP is better 
measure of broad economic activity than are industrial production or personal income.      18 
 
frequency.
 This filter is commonly used despite the potential problems in using this filter noted by Cogley-Nason 
(1995), among others. The third alternative was the monthly total unemployment rate.   Results for the model with 
the first measure are reported in the text, and results for the models using the other two real macroeconomic activity 
measures, which are quite similar to the first model, are in the appendix. Since central banks tend to focus on longer-
term inflation, the inflation rate is measured by the year-over-year rate of the change in the personal consumption 
expenditure deflator, a key series in the Fed‘s evaluation of inflation.
26 This avoids filtering out longer-run inflation 
information as would occur, for example, if we had used the annualized monthly rate of change in the price level. 
The federal funds rate is the monthly average of the daily rate. The rate of change in commodity prices is calculated 
as the annual difference of the log of this series. A description of the real time data and sources of the data is 
provided in the data appendix which is available on request. 
  Monetary policy shocks are identified using a Choleski decomposition. The ordering is: rate of change in 
commodity prices, output gap, inflation rate and then federal funds rate. Placing the funds rate last is based on a 
suggestion by Bernanke-Blinder (1992), and allows a contemporaneous response by the Fed to movements in the 
other three variables while simultaneously imposing a lagged effect of monetary policy on these variables.
27  
  The IRFs for a shock to the federal funds rate for the model with the quadratic trend output gap for both 
estimation periods are presented in Figure 1. In each panel, the solid line is the point estimate and the dotted lines 
are one standard deviation confidence intervals computed using Monte Carlo simulations employing 10,000 draws. 
The general pattern of results is similar for each sample period, but the timing and magnitude of effects differs 
across samples. The magnitude of the one standard deviation federal funds rate shock is comparable across the two 
                                                 
26 Although policy makers  focus on the core personal consumption expenditure deflator,  the core series was not 
used in the model because it was not possible to construct a real-time version of this series for use in the 
experiments.  
27 One concern about this ordering is that it does not allow monetary policy to have a contemporaneous effect on the 
commodity price index which is comprised of auction-market type variables that may well respond within the period 
to monetary policy shocks. Other concerns include (a) the assumption that the central bank responds 
contemporaneously to current period movements in output and the price level whereas data (even preliminary) on 
current period values of these variables is available only with a lag and (b) the constraint that output isn‘t allowed to 
respond contemporaneously to a shock to monetary policy.  Imposing  a lag in the effect of monetary policy on 
inflation is not controversial. Because of these concerns, we estimated a Bernanke (1986)-type structural VAR 
which differed from the Choleski described in the text by allowing a contemporaneous effect of monetary policy on 
commodity prices, by allowing a concurrent effect of monetary policy on output, and by imposing no 
contemporaneous response of the federal funds rate to output and inflation shocks.  The federal funds rate was, 
however, allowed to respond contemporaneously to commodity price shocks.  The point estimates of the IRFs for 
this structural VAR for a shock to the federal funds rate were plotted along with the confidence intervals for the 
Choleski decomposition. The point estimates for a monetary policy shock for all variables for both samples were 
within the Choleski confidence intervals except for a few very minor departures in the very short-run for output.  
Based on these results, we used the Choleski decomposition in all experiments. 19 
 
samples: 0.56 for 1962:-1983:9 and 0.48 for 1980:1-2000:12. A positive shock to the federal funds rate persists 
briefly, but the confidence interval for the funds rate spans zero within 5-6 months, which we interpret as a return to 
the initial value. There is a transitory negative effect on the rate of change in commodity prices, and the effect is 
stronger and more persistent for the 1962:1-1983:9 sample. The output gap becomes negative after several months, 
but returns to its initial value over time. The magnitude of the effect is greater for the 1962:1-1983:9 sample than the 
second sample, but the time required for output to return to its trend and stay there is comparable for both samples. 
There is a transitory negative effect on the rate of change in the personal consumption expenditure price index but 
while the magnitude of the effect differs between the two periods, the time required before the effect becomes 
significant and the time that lapses until the rate of inflation returns to its initial value is about the same across 
samples.  
  Since the VAR models are used to assess the quantitative implications of inflation targeting, it is important 
that the VARs produce paths of the model variables for shocks to monetary policy that are consistent with macro 
models in which monetary policy shocks can temporarily affect real variables.  This appears to be the case for the 
VAR models used in this paper. 
V. Results 
 
In this section, we present a variety of results from the inflation targeting experiments and discuss their 
economic interpretations. The discussion focuses on what policy makers in real time would have seen had they 
employed our methodology.  Specifically, we investigate the nature of the available tradeoffs between inflation and 
output variability and how these tradeoffs have changed in the two periods we consider. As detailed earlier, in each 
experiment we assume that a policy of gradualism to reduce inflation is employed, first for a 48 month transition 
period and then for a 36 month period. Since the standard deviations of output, inflation and the interest rate for each 
target band in both experiments was only slightly greater for the 36-month period than the 48-month period and the 
inferences were the same, we present only the 48-month results.  The 36-month results are in the appendix. The 
benchmark policy is for the midpoint of each inflation band to approach 2% over a 48 month period with 
bandwidths varying between 0% and one that is arbitrarily large. 
  The first experiment begins in 1983:10. The top part of Figure 2 shows the actual inflation rate through 
1983:9 and the base projection of the inflation rate along with the ±1% and ±2% bands moving to the long-run 
inflation target. The inflation rate as measured by the personal consumption expenditures deflator at the outset of 20 
 
this experiment was approximately 3.8%. Note that while the actual inflation rate was relatively low, the base 
projection suggested that inflation would quickly move outside the ±1% bands and approach the upper 2% band. 
Thus, for policy officials using real-time data in late 1983, the need for restrictive monetary policy looked highly 
likely. Such a policy would likely raise the specter of another recession following on the two at the outset of the 
decade, making empirical estimation of the variability tradeoff an important consideration.  
The second experiment begins in 2001:1. Even though inflation was reasonably well contained at 
approximately 2.5% when our second experiment begins and the base projection in the bottom part of Figure 2 puts 
inflation within the 2% inflation bands, uncertainty about the macroeconomic effects of the decline in stock prices 
that began in 2000 suggests it is worth considering the implications of inflation targeting in 2001.   
Summary statistics and basic results for the four bandwidths for both periods are presented in Tables 1 and 
2.
28 As detailed earlier, for each period and each bandwidth, these results are from 1000 trials starting with draws 
from the estimated residuals. Note that while the FAIR relative to the inflation band is used as the criterion of 
whether to intervene in a particular month, in order to be comparable to inflation data as commonly reported, the 
inflation statistics from our experiments reported in Tables 1 and 2 are for the underlying inflation rates for each 
particular month rather than the FAIR.  The results in these tables are based on our 24-month characterization of 
Blinder‘s ‗planning horizon.‘ That is, the information in these tables is analogous to the FOMC Greenbook forecasts 
on the longer-run implications of the current or proposed policy path. 
Table 1 includes basic results. We note three main points. First, for both experiments, the percentage of 
trials with any intervention and the average number of interventions per trial both fall as the width of the bands 
increases. This result is as expected; the wider the inflation band the more likely the FAIR falls within the band and 
the less likely an intervention is needed to maintain average inflation inside the band. The number of interventions 
per trial starts at the maximum of 24 months (the planning horizon) when the bandwidth is zero and is zero when the 
band is arbitrarily wide (in which case it is not necessary to intervene). The percentage of trials with any 
intervention for the 1% and 2% bands is substantially smaller in the 2001 experiment than in the 1983 experiment, 
                                                 
28 We have excluded from the statistics in Tables 1 and 2 those trials in which a negative (nominal) interest rate 
would occur. Generally, the results that include trials in which negative interest rates occur are nearly identical to 
those reported below. Note that negative nominal rates do show up in real-world data on occasion. For example, 
Cecchetti (1988) discusses negative nominal interest rates on some Treasury securities in the 1930s and, more 
recently, Fleming-Garbade (2004) discuss repurchase agrements with negative interest rates. Casual analysis of our 
trials in which negative interest rates occur suggest that they were about the same order of magnitude as those 
appeared in Cecchetti and Fleming-Garbade. 21 
 
and for each of these bands the average number of interventions is substantially lower in 2001. As bandwidth 
increases, the decline in both the percentage of trials with any intervention and the average number of interventions 
is faster in the 2001 experiment than the 1983 experiment.  
  Second, for both samples, the average number of interventions from above the band are substantially 
greater than from below the band. Given the inflationary pressures suggested by the base projections in the two 
experiments, it is not surprising that for the ±1% and ±2% bands, the number of interventions needed to restrain 
inflation (positive policy shocks to the interest rate equation) outnumber the interventions needed to stimulate 
inflation in order to maintain inflation within the bands.  
   Third, for both samples, the average maximum number of consecutive interventions per trial falls as the 
width of the band increases, and the average maximum number of consecutive interventions for the 1% and 2% 
bands are much fewer in number for the 2001 experiment than the 1983 experiment. Consecutive interventions stem 
from our imposition of a mechanical ―commitment‖ to the inflation target objective. In our experiments, there is no 
option for the policymaker to deviate from this objective when computing the intervention.
29 Once the inflation rate 
breaches the edge of the inflation band, depending on the inflation inertia several policy shocks may be needed to 
return average, long-run inflation to the specified level. Also note that even when there is a pattern of several 
consecutive interventions, given an initial intervention, it is less clear that there will necessarily be inertia in the 
interest rate itself, since (i) the interventions are partly a function of the random draws for all the variables, which 
can entail consecutive interventions but not necessarily of the same sign, and (ii) there is an endogenous component 
to the funds rate equation over and above the intervention term.
 30  
   Table 2 provides a more detailed look at the policy interventions. Recall that each trial is initiated with a 
random draw from the estimated residuals, replacing the interest rate shock with a computed policy residual 
whenever the FAIR is outside the bounds of the inflation target band. The estimated residuals are, of course, zero 
mean since they are the result of OLS regressions. The computed policy residuals need  not be zero mean, and in our 
setting where the general pattern is for inflation to breach the upper bound of the target range (see Figures 2 and 3) 
the average policy intervention is a positive interest rate shock to restrain the economy and lower the average 
                                                 
29 See equations (A2) and (A3) in the appendix. 
30 Because each trial in each experiment that eventually builds up to the variability frontier always selects the policy 
innovation needed to attain the inflation goal, there is a risk of instrument instability. While our approach does not 
rule out instrument instability, it is also possible that inertia in the interest rate will result. It turns out that there is 
substantial smoothing of the interest rate in our counterfactual simulations, even though we have not imposed any 
features that would explicitly limit the magnitude of interest rate movements.
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inflation rate. In Table 2, we take the entire set of residuals with which we end up from the trials for the 1% and 2% 
bands and separate them into those that were drawn from the historical residuals and the policy residuals we 
computed in order to keep average inflation at the acceptable level.
31 For the 5
th and 95
th percentile shocks (used to 
avoid any outliers) we find that the 95
th percentile policy shock is about one and a half to two times the size of the 
comparable estimated residual. Furthermore, note that the average policy shock is well within the range of the 
shocks of the estimated residuals. Policy innovations outside the historical norm range occur, but not on average.  
  Table 3 shows the fundamental results:  the standard deviations of the key variables for each bandwidth of 
each experiment. These standard deviations, also plotted in Figures 3 and 4, show the basic results of the paper:  the 
estimated tradeoffs over time between inflation and output variability and inflation and interest rate variability. We 
note, for both periods, that as we move from the stochastic simulation of the historical policy in the estimated VAR 
(the infinity band, where no interventions are called for) to the 2% target band, inflation variability falls and output 
variability rises since more tightly controlling inflation implies the policy maker must accept the higher output 
volatility as a consequence. The absolute value of the change in output variability is less than the change in inflation 
variability—their ratio is .7 in both experiments. As we move from the 2% band to a 1% band, the absolute value of 
the ratio of the change in output variability to the change in inflation variability is 1.3 for the 1983 experiment and 
1.4 for the 2001 experiment.  Finally, as we move from a 1% band to achieving the target without variability (the 
0% band), the absolute value of the ratio of the change in output variability to the change in inflation variability is 2 
for the 1983 experiment and 3 for the 2001 experiment.   The point on the tradeoff that would be chosen by the 
central bank clearly depends on the central bank‘s preferences regarding output and inflation variability – the point 
that, in the earlier words of Svensson, ―looks best.‖
32 Our technique provides a data-driven methodology for 
estimating the objective tradeoff faced by the central bank.
33 
Figure 3 plots the tradeoff data from Table 3 and shows a roughly parallel downward and inward shift of 
the inflation-output variability tradeoff over time.  For example, in the 2001 experiment, inflation variability equal to 
                                                 
31 Note that for the 0% band, all the innovations are (almost certainly) policy innovations and for the arbitrarily wide 
band, there are no policy innovations, so the 1% and 2% bands discussed in Table 2 are the only relevant 
comparisons. 
32 Implicitly, movement along the tradeoff reflects alternative policy maker preferences. In Svensson‘s setup as 
summarized in equation (4), the tradeoff between inflation and output is a function of   , his relative weight on 
output variability. An analogous point holds here where we have instead normalized the implicit loss function on 
inflation variability as expressed in in section II above. 
33 Results analogous to those in Table 3 for the case of a 36-month transtion horizon are included in appendix table 
A2. The implications are virtually the same as those reported in the text for the 24-month case. 23 
 
.006 (1% band) is associated with output variability of .011 whereas for the 1983 experiment output variability 
implicitly associated with the same inflation variability is approximately .019 (0% band), about 70% higher than for 
the 2001 experiment.   
In Figure 4, similar results are found for the inflation-interest rate variability tradeoffs.  Smaller inflation 
targeting bands are associated with greater interest rate variability since more frequent and larger interest rate 
adjustments are required for more precise inflation control.  As in Figure 3, the inflation- interest rate variability 
tradeoff also shifts inward in a roughly parallel fashion; for given inflation variability, we observe much lower 
interest rate variability in the second period.   
   Given the differences in methodology, data, and estimation periods, only rough comparisons between our 
analysis and other work can be made.  A particularly difficult methodological issue is the translation of weights in a 
loss function into explicit values for the width of inflation target bands; absence of an exact correspondence between 
the width of target bands and specific weights on output stabilization make direct comparison with research based on 
loss function weights difficult. However, we will discuss our variability tradeoff with another in the literature that, 
as closely as we can find, approximates our presentation.  
  Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) (RS) start with a loss function that has inflation deviations from target, the 
output gap, and the change in the interest rate as arguments. They minimize this loss function subject to a model of 
the economy that includes a Phillips curve/aggregate supply specification and an IS/aggregate demand equation. 
Policy focuses on the relevant feedback function for the nominal interest rate in the IS curve. Among the eleven 
simulated policy rules (some with several variants) that are compared with the optimal setting derived from the 
formal minimization are two that focus on inflation forecast targeting, their ―FIFT‖ and ―FIFTS‖ policy rules. Their 
FIFT rules assume no interest smoothing while the FIFTS rules allow various degrees of such smoothing. As our 
model does not preclude such smoothing, and our interest rate paths show that interest rate variations are relatively 
small (i.e., the data seem to select a path for the policy interest rate that exhibits patterns consistent with partial 
adjustment) we will briefly compare our results with the RS FIFTS model. 
  Since we have targeted a two-year inflation forecast, and given that RS use quarterly data, our comparison 
focuses on their eight-quarter forecast rule (FIFTS(8)). As noted in Table 3 and as plotted in Figure 3, when the 
standard deviation of inflation in our experiments is .006 (for the 1% bandwidth in the 2001 experiment and for the 
0% bandwidth for the 1983 experiment) output variability was .011 (2001) and .019 (1983). From the RS results in 24 
 
their Tables 5.3 – 5.7 (using various sets of weights on loss function arguments), for about the same inflation 
variability,
34 the RS output variability
35 varies from .0187 (.0066 inflation variability) to .0267 (.0050 inflation 
variability). We also note that as a rough point estimate, when we examine Fig. 5.2 which plots the variability 
tradeoff for FIFTS(8) as well as other rules, we see that inflation variability of .006 (2.4 in the figure) is associated 
with output variability of about .002. Thus, our results seem reasonably close to theirs for this particular comparison, 
given the differences in methodologies and differences in sample periods for estimation.  However, as noted earlier, 
conclusions from this comparison should be tempered by the fact there is no straightforward way to directly translate 
loss function weights in their study to the bandwidths in ours.  
    Finally, an important question is: What is the source of the inward shift in the inflation-output variability 
tradeoff between the two periods that we find? Although we cannot definitively identify the reason(s) for the shift, 
we note that much of the sample used in the estimation of the VAR for the later period spans the period of the 
―Great Moderation‖ in macroeconomic volatility.  Explanations for the Great Moderation include good luck in terms 
of reduction in the frequency and magnitude of economic shocks and better monetary policy, and evidence has been 
presented in support of both explanations.   The consensus from studies such as Stock-Watson (2002), Ahmed-
Levin-Wilson (2004), and Sims-Zha (2006a) is that ―good luck‖ in the form of reduced variability of non-monetary 
policy shocks is primarily responsible for the increased stability of the real economy since the mid-1980s.  However, 
Stock-Watson (2002) attribute from 10-25% of the reduced variability in the real economy to improved monetary 
policy, and Ahmed-Levin-Wilson (2004) find that, although ―good policy‖ doesn‘t seem to explain much of the 
reduced variability in real output, it is important in understanding the reduction in inflation variability. 
In regard to the ―good policy‖ explanation, we note that much of the recent literature on monetary policy 
suggests that inflation targeting allows central banks to gradually gain credibility. Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1999) 
suggest that credible policy ―… enables the central bank to stabilize the economy with relatively modest movements 
in the short rate‖ (pp. 1689-90), and Carlstrom-Fuerst (2005) present simulations showing that central bank 
credibility allows the Fed to achieve given objectives with smaller policy interventions than in the case where 
credibility is lacking. Cecchetti-Flores-Laguna-Krause (2006), based on a cross-section of both developed and 
                                                 
34 RS compute the average inflation rate as 400*[ln pt – ln pt-1].  We translate their inflation standard deviation into 
one approximately equal to ours by dividing their standard deviations by 400. Across their experiments, their 
inflation standard deviation ranges from .0050 to .0066. 
35 RS use the output gap in percentage points, while we use decimal form. Thus, dividing their output gap standard 
deviations by 100 produces roughly comparable results. 25 
 
developing countries, find that, for most countries, monetary policy was more efficient in the 1990s than in the 
1980s and that better  monetary policy led to a significant improvement in macroeconomic performance.
36  
Unfortunately, our technique does not allow us to distinguish between the ―good luck‖ and ―good policy‖ 
explanations, but we note the fact that the tradeoff can shift substantially over time suggests that central banks 
cannot regard the tradeoff as fixed over time.   
VI. The Counterfactual Experiments and the Lucas Critique 
 
An important issue in any counterfactual experiment is whether the Lucas critique would invalidate the 
results. With respect to the first experiment, we noted earlier that the 1962:1-1983:9 period over which the model 
was estimated was a period in which there was a great deal of variation in output and inflation, especially during the 
immediate post-October, 1979 months at the end of the estimation period for this experiment. Romer-Romer (2002) 
characterized the estimation period as one in which the norm was substantial fluctuations in monetary policy 
variables, and Sims-Zha (2006a) found the 1979-83 period to be distinct. The period covered by the estimation 
sample for our second experiment, ending in December 2000, appears to be more settled in terms of policy, with 
interest rate targeting effectively governing most of the period, culminating with substantial attention to the Taylor 
rule and its role in the Great Moderation. As an initial attempt to examine the importance of Lucas-critique 
problems, following Dufour (1980; 1982), we re-estimated the model over 1962:1-1983:9 and 1980:1-2000:12, 
adding a 0-1 dummy variable for each month in which instability is suspected. For the first sample, we added a 
separate dummy variable for each month of the post-October 1979 period included in the sample, 1979:10 through 
1983:9, the period of nonborrowed reserve targeting plus an approximate one year transition period from the end of 
nonborrowed reserve targeting. For the second sample, we included separate monthly dummies for 1980:1 (the first 
observation in the estimation period) through 1983:12 (roughly the period of nonborrowed reserve targeting in the 
second sample and an approximate one year transition period from the end of nonborrowed reserve targeting). 
Following Sims-Zha (2006b), we used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC) to compare the models with and without the dummies and thereby to provide information about the 
stability of the model.   The AIC indicated the model with dummies was preferred for both samples, hence 
indicating instability. However, the SIC suggested that the model without the dummies was preferred for both 
samples. Thus, evidence regarding the stability of the model over the estimation periods is mixed. 
                                                 
36In their study, Cecchetti et. al. (2006) estimate inflation variability-output variability tradeoffs derived from a 
small structural model and an explicit loss function.          26 
 
While stability tests can usefully shed light on potential Lucas concerns within the estimation period, in our 
real-time setting the policy maker is concerned in addition whether a proposed policy action will trigger among 
agents in the economy the perception that a proposed policy would be interpreted as a regime shift. If so, then the 
variability tradeoffs we presented in Figures 3 and 4 would be of little use in evaluating the available tradeoffs to 
policy makers. To this end, Leeper-Zha (2003) have introduced a ―modesty statistic‖ intended to evaluate whether a 
prospective policy initiative is likely to be viewed as a modest policy intervention.  
The Leeper-Zha theoretical approach is a Markov-switching model, with each regime a linear model of the 
economy (a VAR in their case). Within a regime, the effect of a policy intervention is as described by the first term 
on the right hand side of our equation (10), the impact of the proposed policy relative to the base projection.  















   provides their ―modesty statistic.‖
37 Leeper-Zha (2003) note that the ―modesty statistic‖ has a standard 
normal distribution, so when this statistic is less than 2, the policy innovation embedded in the path over t+1 to t+n 
does not induce agents to change their assessments about the policy regime in place.
38  
We have computed the Leeper-Zha modesty statistic in the context of our counterfactual experiments, 
modifying their approach by using the randomly drawn disturbances to the other equations under which our policy 
interventions are computed rather than assuming that the shocks to the non-policy equations are all zero. Under this 
condition, in the trials underlying our basic results in Figures 3 and 4, the largest computed modesty statistics (in 
absolute value) for each experiment are presented in Table 4, where in each cell the relevant statistics for the impact 
of the policy sequence for output, the inflation rate, and the interest rate are given respectively. All the computed 
statistics are well below 2.0, so that there is no evidence that our proposed inflation bands and the policies needed to 
achieve them would have triggered Lucas critique-type concerns among agents in the economy. This implies, 
importantly, added confidence that the tradeoffs presented in Figures 3 and 4 can be reasonably interpreted as valid 
tradeoffs available to policy makers. 
                                                 
37 Consistent with our approach, Leeper-Zha use the shock to the policy equation as the policy innovation, and 
assume as we do that ―… although the policy advisor chooses [the -innovation], private agents treat it as random.‖ 
(Leeper-Zha, p. 1678). 
38 Of course, alternative policy regimes can be ―close‖ to each other, so that distinguishing between these regimes 
may be difficult. Thus, a modesty statistic of less than 2 is necessary but not sufficient to claim that no important 
Lucas effects are present. 27 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion  
  Our focus in this paper is twofold: (i) illustration of how a VAR model can be used to implement and 
evaluate inflation forecast targeting and (ii) the derivation in real time of the output-inflation variability tradeoff 
available to the central bank under inflation forecast targeting and estimation of how this tradeoff has changed over 
time. Tolerance bands of varying widths around transitional inflation targets constructed to achieve 2% inflation are 
considered.    
  Our inflation forecast targeting approach is based on dynamic, stochastic simulations of the average 
inflation rate over a two-year horizon using the moving average representation of the VAR model.  Deviations of the 
forecast average inflation rate from target generate interventions in the form of changes in the federal funds rate 
designed to gradually push the forecast inflation rate back to target, and we compute the required adjustments to the 
federal funds rate. 
  The technique is illustrated through two counterfactual experiments using real-time data.  The first 
experiment begins in 1983:10 and is based on a VAR estimated over 1962:1-1983:9 whereas the second experiment 
begins in 2001:1 using a model estimated over 1980:1-2000:12.  In terms of technical results, we find: (1) less 
intervention is needed as the width of the bands increases, and fewer interventions are needed in the 2001 
experiment than in the 1983 experiment; (2) more interventions are needed to reduce the inflation rate than are 
needed to raise the inflation rate, reflecting the inflationary pressures during the periods, which in turn makes 
targeting exercises important; (3) fewer consecutive interventions are required as the width of the target band 
increases, and fewer consecutive interventions are needed for the 2001 experiment than the 1983 experiment; and 
(4) a given inflation variability is associated with lower output and interest rate variability in the 2001 experiment 
than in the 1983 experiment, i.e. the trade-offs between inflation variability and output variability and inflation 
variability and interest rate variability shifted favorably between our time periods. As noted earlier, the source of the 
shift might stem from ―good luck‖ or ―good policy‖, but a critical lesson is that significant shifts in the trade-offs 
have occurred over time and hence that the objective trade-offs faced by the central bank should not be assumed to 
be fixed.   
 




Table 1: Frequency of Policy Interventions 
 
  0% band  1% band  2% band  ∞ band 
A. 1983 Experiment         
  Average interventions per 24 month trial 
       From above band 













Average maximum consecutive interventions  24.0  12.0  9.2  0 
Percent of trials with any intervention  100  93.4  73.0  0 
 
B. 2001 Experiment         
   Average interventions per 24 month trial 
       From above band 













Average maximum consecutive interventions  24.0  7.7  1.6  0 




      Table 2: Detailed Analysis of Shocks 
 
  1% Band  2% Band 
A. 1983 Experiment  Random Residuals  Policy Residuals  Random Residuals  Policy Residuals 
     5
th percentile  -.007  -.006  -.007  -.005 
     95
th percentile  .009  .020  .009  .015 
     Mean Policy  
       Residual    .0045    .0036 
         
B. 2001 Experiment  Random Residuals  Policy Residuals  Random Residuals  Policy Residuals 
     5
th percentile  -.006  -.004  -.006  -.004 
     95
th percentile  .008  .013  .008  .013 
     Mean Policy  






Table 3: Standard Deviations of Key Variables 
 
  0% band  1% band  2% band  ∞ band 
A. 1983 Experiment         
     Output  .01984  .01428  .01047  .00819 
     Inflation  .00605  .00883  .01178  .01492 
     Interest rate                                               .04519  .02636  .01586  .01167 
 
B. 2001 Experiment         
     Output  .01692  .01117  .00967  .00963 
     Inflation  .00435  .00614  .00723  .00733 




Table 4: Modesty Statistics 
 
  0% band 
{y, p, i} 
1% band 
{y, p, i} 
2% band 
{y, p, i} 
∞ band 
{y, p, i} 
         
1983 Experiment  .92,  .53, .71  .81,  .48, .68  .70,  .49, .65  .75,  .61, .52 
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 Appendix: Implementing Inflation Target Simulations 
  In this appendix, we provide technical detail on computation of the FAIR and how we compute the policy 
actions needed to maintain it on or inside a target band. Let the elements k and j in the vector  t y  represent the 
federal funds rate and inflation, respectively. Consider the j
th equation in text equation system (3) when n=1, which 
is the one-period-ahead inflation equation: 
              , 1 0, , 1 ,1
1
N
j t ji i t j
i
y d BP  

          (A1.1) 
Under the assumption that policy makers are concerned with a 24 month average inflation rate, for periods 2 through 
24, the analogous equations are 
              , 2 0, , 2 1, , 1 ,2
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        , 24 0, , 24 1, , 23 23, , 1 ,24
1 1 1
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            (A1.24) 
Summing equations (A1.1) through (A1.24) and then averaging yields 
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  We next show how to compute the current period policy shock needed to attain the FAIR. Define 




j t j t j t j t Y y y y          to be the forecast inflation rate and let the targeted, average inflation rate be 
*
, 1 , 1 , 2 , 24
1 * ()
24
j t j t j t j t Y y y y         .
1 Assume for now that the goal is to achieve this target exactly; that is, 2 
 
assume for now that the width of the inflation band is zero. Then conditional on  i,t 1 ε , i k,    as well as on 
2 3, 24 ,, t t t       there is a value for the current policy innovation, ,1 kt   that will achieve this inflation target. 
Specifically, we solve the previous equation for the policy innovation undertaken at the beginning of period t+1 
designed to attain the target:    
1 23
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  We next relax the assumption that the average inflation rate is targeted exactly, and show how to pursue a 
policy objective of constraining inflation to lie within a given, predetermined bandwidth. For period t+1, we want 
the inflation rate within the pre-specified band
*
,1 jt Y     where  is half the bandwidth.
1 It may be that no policy 
intervention is needed, which will occur when the shocks to the economic system are such that  
**
, 1 , 1 , 1 j t j t j t Y Y Y         . 
If, on the other hand,  
*
, 1 , 1 j t j t YY    
or if  
*
, 1 , 1 j t i t YY    , 
a policy intervention is needed to return the inflation rate either to the edge of the band or to some pre-specified 
value interior to it. For instance, if the policy choice is to return to the edge of the band, then the policy innovation is 
computed by replacing the term  , 1 , 2 , 24 ( )* j t j t j t y y y        in equation (A2) with  
,1
*
, 1 , 2 , 24 ( )*
it j t j t j t y y y Y 
          , depending on whether the FAIR is computed to be above or below the 
tolerance range. 
                                                 
1 As specified, the band is symmetric. If the policy maker were to set policy actions to return inflation to a particular 
path strictly within the band, then asymmetric bands would also be of interest. For example, the policy maker might 
respond to a given upward shock to the inflation rate, but not to a downward shock of the same absolute value, as in 
an opportunistic disinflation policy. It is straightforward to allow for asymmetric bands. 3 
 
  The policy action undertaken in period t+1 implies a subsequent path for the system‘s variables, and later 
evaluation of policy actions must take t+1 policy into account; again, the policy approach implies history 
dependence. Given this policy action, the average, prospective inflation for the h-period horizon covering periods 
t+2 through t+25 may be computed similarly to the discussion in equations (A1.1) through (A1.24):  
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To attain the target inflation rate exactly, solve for  ,2 kt    conditional on  ,1 ˆkt   : 
1 23
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If the bandwidth is nonzero, then analogous to the earlier discussion, replace  , 2 , 3 , 25 ( )* j t j t j t y y y        with  
*
, 2 , 3 , 25 , 2 ( )* j t j t j t i t y y y Y            .
2 
  Note that, generalizing equations like (A2) or (A3) to period t+j, computation of the t+j period policy shock 
needed to attain the FAIR for the subsequent 24 months would include two kinds of terms: policy interventions 
                                                 
2 Note that in equations (A2) and (A3), our policy actions generally respond to all the information in the model. In 
contrast, policy actions based on the well-know Taylor rule only respond to, say, information on output (relative to 
potential) and deviations of inflation from target. 
 4 
 
needed return the average inflation rate to the band and shocks from the random draw for those periods in which no 
intervention is needed.  
  For the various bandwidths of each experiment, we specify a target path and specify a band around this 
path. Since we sample from the estimated residuals, we do not impose any arbitrary assumptions about the 
probability density generating the shocks to the economy. For each trial, computed values for the system variables 
are those the economy will follow using the assumed policy interventions that keep the FAIR inside the designated 
band, given the shocks to the other equations.
3 
Data Appendix  
1. Real time real GDP data are from the routput.xls file from the qvad folder available for download from the 
Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank.  The relevant columns of this file are: routput83q4 for the sample that ends in 
1983:9 and routput01q1 for the sample that ends in 2000:12.  Data in column routput01q1 were known in the first 
quarter of the respective years, and we assume this data was known by the Fed at the beginning of the relevant 
counterfactual experiments.  Data in column routput83q4 were known in the fourth quarter of 1983.  Since our 1983 
counterfactual begins in November 1983, the Fed may not have had all the information in this column at the 
beginning of the counterfactual.  However, we wanted to begin the counterfactual a year after the end of reserve 
targeting, and this was the closest approximation to real time GDP data we could obtain for November 1983.   
As noted in the text, for each sample various filters were used to construct a potential GDP series, and each  output 
gap measure was then constructed as actual real GDP minus the filtered potential GDP.  The quarterly real time 
output gaps were then interpolated to monthly data using the distrib.src procedure in RATS 6.02b.     
 
2. Real time personal consumption expenditure deflator data were taken from various issues of the Survey of 
Current Business.  
a. 1962:1-1983:9 sample. 1961-1976: November 1979 Survey of Current Business; 1977-1978:  October  1982 
Survey of Current Business; 1979-1983:9: July 1983 Survey of Current Business.  Monthly data. 
 b. 1980:1-2000:12 sample. August 2000 Survey of Current Business, Table 3 and the February 2001 Survey of 
Current Business, Table 7.1.   The data in these tables were quarterly, and were interpolated to monthly using the 
distrib.src procedure in RATS 6.02b. 
c. We note that the data set for 1980:1-2000:12 is not totally a pure real time data set since data at the very end of 
2000 was pulled from the earliest Survey of Current Business in 2001.  
 
3. The federal funds rate is taken from the Global Insight Basic database, series fyff, and the commodity price index 
is the Commodity Research Bureau spot market index for all commodities (Global Insight Basic database, series 







                                                 
3 While it is possible to do so, we do not take into account the possibility that the model coefficients may be 































36 Month Reduction in Inflation Rate 
Table A1: Frequency of Policy Interventions 
 
  0% band  1% band  2% band  ∞ band 
A. 1983 Experiment         
  Average interventions per 24 month trial 
       From above band 













Average maximum consecutive interventions  24.0  12.9  10.2  0 
Percent of trials with any intervention  100  94.3  78.2  0 
 
B. 2001 Experiment         
   Average interventions per 24 month trial 
       From above band 













Average maximum consecutive interventions  24.0  8.0  1.7  0 




36 Month Reduction in Inflation Rate 
Table A2: Standard Deviations of Key Variables 
 
  0% band  1% band  2% band  ∞ band 
A. 1983 Experiment         
     Output  .02016  .01453  .01083  .00819 
     Inflation  .00641  .00940  .01249  .01568 
     Interest rate                                               .04508  .02640  .01662  .01167 
 
B. 2001 Experiment         
     Output  .01697  .01120  .00970  .00963 
     Inflation  .00434  .00619  .00729  .00739 
     Interest Rate                                       .04019  .01491  .01077  .01039 
 
 